Subjects performed a rapid feeling-of-knowing task developed by (Reder, L. M., & Ritter, F. (1992). What determines initial feeling of knowing? Familiarity with question terms, not with the answer. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18,[435][436][437][438][439][440][441][442][443][444][445][446][447][448][449][450][451], while event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded to identify the time course of "feeling-of-knowing" signals. Subjects were shown a series of math problems, some of which were repeated multiple times during the course of the experiment, and subjects had to rapidly decide whether the answer to a given problem could be quickly retrieved from memory (retrieval trials) or had to be calculated on scrap paper (calculate trials). Behavioral results replicated the 1992 study, showing that subjects can estimate whether the answer is known much faster than the answer can be retrieved. ERPs time-locked to the onset of the math problem showed that accurate retrieval trials were associated with greater positivity for an early frontal P2 component (epoched from 180 to 280 ms) and a frontal-central P3 component (epoched from 300 to 550 ms). Moreover, this feelingof-knowing signal was not found for subjects who never obtained a successful on-time retrieval. We interpret these findings as suggesting that initial feeling-of-knowing relies on a rapid assessment of the "perceptual fluency" with which the stimulus is processed. If a stimulus is deemed sufficiently familiar, the activation level of an internal problem representation is used to arrive at a decision of whether to search for the answer or to calculate it.
Task performance frequently involves selection among multiple strategies that could potentially lead to a correct response (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Reder, 1982 Reder, , 1987 Siegler, 1996) . People not only select among available strategies but also shift quickly and adaptively from one strategy to another depending on their cognitive abilities or features of the task environment (Lovett & Anderson, 1996; Reder, 1988; Reder & Ross, 1983; Reder, Wible, & Martin, 1986; Schunn & Reder, 2001; Schunn, Lovett, & Reder, 2001) . For people to select among strategies as quickly as they do, it is necessary that they possess heuristics that can be rapidly executed. Reder (1987) postulated that when deciding how to answer a question, people might use the familiarity of the question features to decide whether it is likely that the answer is known and that it is worthwhile to initiate a search of memory. Consistent with that conjecture, subjects were able to make a binary decision as to whether the answer to a general-knowledge question was likely to be known in considerably less time than they could begin articulating the answer itself, suggesting the heuristic could indeed influence the tendency to initiate a search (Reder, 1987 E-mail address: cpaynter@andrew.cmu.edu (C.A. Paynter). 1 Prior to Reder's work on strategy selection, the term "feeling-of-knowing" (FOK) had referred to subjects' ability to accurately predict, after a memory retrieval failure, whether the correct answer could be recognized (Hart, 1965) . Most FOK studies have a generally good predictor of answer availability, the heuristic was shown to be imperfect and could be subverted by inducing spurious feelings of familiarity with pairs of terms in the question (Jameson, Narens, Goldfarb, & Nelson, 1990; Reder, 1987) .
Reder and Ritter (1992) conducted a further examination of the initial feeling-of-knowing (hereafter abbreviated FOK) heuristic in a task in which subjects were shown a series of unfamiliar math problems (e.g. 24 × 36), some of which were repeated many times over the course of the experiment. Subjects were required to respond in less than 850 ms whether or not they knew the answer. If "retrieve" was selected, the subject then had to quickly retrieve the answer. If "calculate" was selected, the subject had substantially longer to calculate the answer by hand. There was a monetary incentive to choose "retrieve," but only if the correct answer could be given on time. Subjects performed this task with high accuracy. However, problems that looked similar but for which the answer was unknown resulted in spurious feelings-of-knowing. The conclusion of that study and a follow-up (Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, & Stroffolino, 1997) is that people can rapidly assess whether they are likely to know the answer, but the assessment is not based on an early read of the answer. Instead, it is based 
